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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate institutional change as the co-occurrence of deinstitutionalization and 
institutionalization, while accounting for its determinants at multiple levels of analysis to 
further our understanding of how individual characteristics aggregated at the organizational 
level and organizational characteristics together account for the erosion and emergence of 
practices within the field. We empirically explore this question in a multi-level dataset of UK 
law firms and their employees, looking in particular at how the practice of equity partnership 
faded away and how non-equity partnership emerged as a new practice. Our results contribute 
to the literature on institutional change and the micro-foundation of institutions.  
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Recent scholarship in institutional theory in the past decade has examined the links between 
micro processes, how they aggregate at the organizational level, and institutional dynamics 
(Powell & Colyvas, 2008). The micro-foundations agenda in institutional theory, in particular, 
has tried to inform the role played by everyday actions and processes carried out at a more 
micro-level in the institutionalization process (Powell & Rerup, 2017). However, how this 
micro-level exactly works, what matters there and how it does, remain to be fully understood. 
For some scholars, this perspective put more focus and importance to broadly defined agents 
(Battilana, 2006; Powell & Rerup, 2017), while others see it as an opportunity to focus on 
interactions at various levels of analysis (Gibson & Vom Lehn, 2017). Recent work has framed 
this debate around the dichotomy of agency versus structure (Cardinale, 2018), while others 
have challenged this dichotomy to stress the importance of considering multiple levels (or a 
continuum of levels) of analysis in examining the micro-foundations of institutions (Harmon et 
al., 2018). These authors call for multi-level analyses to advance our understanding of the 
micro-foundations of institutions, taking into account that the characteristics of organizations 
are driven in part by the characteristics of their members and that the population of an 
organization, its composition and attributes influence its decision-making and this, in turn, 
influences more macro dynamics.  
At the same time, research has examined institutional change (Micelotta et al., 2017), 
in particular through the prism of divergence and convergence of institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization processes (Oliver, 1992). Institutions may erode under a variety of 
conditions, as they lose enactors and participants (Davis et al., 1994), creating space for new 
institutions to emerge (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001). Existing work on deinstitutionalization 
focuses on a single level of analysis and looks at the characteristics of organizations that explain 
non-conformity (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). However, conceptual research suggests the 
existence of trickling up mechanisms as individual behaviours lead to collective decisions to 
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disengage from a practice (Clemente & Roulet, 2015), that is, the aggregate behaviours of 
individuals within organizations may tilt their decisions with regards to institutions (Oliver, 
1992). Similarly, we can expect that institutionalization involves trickling down mechanisms, 
from the structure to the group to the individuals engaging in a practice (Harmon et al., 2018). 
Deinstitutionalization and institutionalization can be seen as two faces of the same coin 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009) as there is a recursive process alternating deinstitutionalization of old 
practices and institutionalization of new practices (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Clemente et al., 
2017). Because of these mechanisms of trickling up and trickling down, a focus on the micro-
foundations of institutional change as the co-occurrence of deinstitutionalization and 
institutionalization would inform more broadly the role of micro-level dynamics and their 
aggregation at the organizational level in institutional theory. 
In this paper, we aim at explaining the link between organizational and aggregated 
individual characteristics, on the one hand, and institutional change, as captured in the co-
occurrence of deinstitutionalization and institutionalization of a new practice, on the other hand, 
as one way to advance the micro-foundations agenda. In particular, we flesh out trickling up 
mechanisms that can ultimately explain why organizations deviate from existing practices 
because of their internal members and their idiosyncratic characteristics.  
We empirically explore the question of how individuals, at the aggregate level, and 
organizational characteristics influence organizational decisions with regards to an 
institutionalized practice using an original and comprehensive multi-level dataset capturing the 
characteristics of organizations and their senior employees. Our quantitative study examines 
equity partnership in the UK legal industry and the growing number of firms engaging in a new 
practice: non-equity partnership (i.e., salaried partnership). Our dependent variable reflects the 
change of career structures and practices and the degree of engagement with the new practice, 
and thus the concurrent deinstitutionalization of the old practice (equity partnerships) and the 
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institutionalization of the new one (non-equity partnership). The mutually exclusive transition 
from the collegial model of partnership (comprising only equity partnership) to the multi-tier 
partnership (including also non-equity partnership) is a strategically motivated change for law 
firms. We explore how demographic aspects of the organizational population such as 
profitability per equity partner, compensation disparity, percentage of partners on associates 
(normally referred to as leverage ratio), gender diversity, and partners’ reputation are associated 
with the adoption – or the non-adoption – of the new practice of non-equity partnership.  
Our work contributes to fleshing out organizational and aggregated individual 
determinants of institutional change, as they motivate and trigger organizations’ deviance from 
institutionalized practices and the adoption and institutionalization of new practices. By looking 
at how individual populations influence organizational decisions with regards to 
institutionalized practices, we stress the importance of including a multiplicity of levels of 
analysis in the study of institutional change, and more broadly in the study of the micro-
foundations of institutional theory. 
 
MICRO-FOUNDATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
In the last decade, institutional theory has increasingly paid attention to its ‘micro-foundations’ 
(Powell & Rerup, 2017) although this call dates back to Zucker (1991) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991). However, limited progress has been made since then (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). 
The objective of the micro-foundation movement is to “understand how individual-level factors 
impact organizations, how the interaction of individuals leads to emergent, collective, and 
organization-level outcomes and performance, and how relations between macro variables are 
mediated by micro actions and interactions” (Felin et al., 2015: 576). In institutional theory, the 
starting point of the micro-foundations agenda is the idea that institutions are modified and 
reproduced through the everyday actions of individuals (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Individuals 
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are not only cognitive carriers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), but also actors that can bend or 
reproduce institutions (Lawrence et al., 2009). One reason why progress has been limited in the 
micro-foundations of institutions is the lack of clarity with regards to what exactly micro-
foundations are. In particular, there has been an oscillation between focusing on interactionism 
(Gibson & Vom Lehn, 2017) and a perspective considering agents as a broadly defined set of 
actors that can affect and reciprocally be affected by structure (Battilana, 2006) – “recurrent 
patterns of interaction or the mechanisms that cause them” (Cardinale, 2018: 137). 
 
Micro-foundations of institutions: Agency and levels of analysis 
A debate over the definition of micro-foundations exists, reflecting the tensions between 
individualism, holism and systemism (Reihlen et al., 2007). The micro-foundations of 
institutions can be defined as the ways individual behaviour can support or challenge 
institutions (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). For some authors, micro-foundations are a way to solve 
the agency vs. structure debate (Cardinale, 2018). Early work in this area indeed brought the 
role of agents to the front to explain endogenous institutional change (Battilana, 2006). 
Structure is the product of human agency but at the same time constrain human agency 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). To solve this problem of embedded agency, Cardinale (2018) 
suggested that structure is not only a constrain to action but also a compass that orients agents, 
and provide them with pre-reflexivity. Empirical work has thus shown that institutional change 
can originate from the everyday action of individuals (Smets et al., 2012). Structure and agency 
are however often equated to a macro-micro divide (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) which limits 
our view of what agents can be and the way they can bend or reproduce structure. “Bottom-up 
change” (Smets et al., 2012: 879) is not only the consequences of individuals slowly changing 
field-level practices, but individuals changing the decisions made by organizations, as their 
effect on structure is mediated by the organizational level of analysis. 
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 Beyond further theorization of the agency vs. structure dichotomy, a focus on the role 
of agents needs to go beyond the sole role of individuals to take into account the way they affect 
organizational decision making as a population (Harmon et al., 2018). This is consistent with a 
view of social theory as accounting for individual-, organizational- and field-levels of analysis 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). In the case explored by Smets et al. (2012), the change at the 
organizational level, triggered by individual-level changes in practices, ultimately led to the 
field-level institutionalization of a new practice. It shows that macro-level phenomena are not 
only the consequences of individual behaviours (Coleman, 1986), but are also the result of 
individuals and organizations interrelatedly affecting institutions (Udehn, 2002).  
 Looking at the behaviour of organizations through their micro-level composition is a 
way to move forward the research agenda on the micro-foundations of institutions, considering 
the importance of intermediate levels of analysis between individuals and fields. We focus here 
on how the demography and population characteristics of organizations can help us understand 
organizational decision making. Such perspective also enables to account for the nestedness of 
levels of analysis as “everything is micro to something and macro to something else” (Harmon 
et al., 2018). Including multiple levels of analysis when identifying the determinants of 
institutional processes also ensures that key mechanisms at the organizational- or field-levels 
are not ignored beyond individual behaviours. 
 
Institutional change as the co-occurrence of deinstitutionalization and 
institutionalization: A new perspective on micro-foundations 
In parallel to the debate on the micro-foundations of institutional theory, a recent body of work 
has brought together institutionalization and deinstitutionalization as two sides of the same coin 
(Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) to explain and understand institutional change (Micelotta et al., 
2017). Cycles of stability – in which actors engage in practices that amount into the 
  8
reproduction of institutions – succeed to cycles of change – during which new practices emerge. 
As noted by Zietsma and Lawrence (2010), existing work in institutional theory tends to focus 
solely on either stability or change and to ignore the way in which one process leaves room for 
the other. 
 One of the processes at the core of institutional lifecycle is deinstitutionalization (Oliver, 
1992; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Deinstitutionalization is the process leading to the erosion or 
abandonment of a practice and can be triggered by either external pressures or internal agents 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009). For Oliver (1992), deinstitutionalization refers to the erosion or 
discontinuity of an institutionalized organizational activity or practice. In fact, 
deinstitutionalization suggests a shift in existing practices and activities (Davis, et al., 1994). 
Deinstitutionalization and institutionalization are two interrelated process, as a practice is 
institutionalized when it has gained enough legitimacy to become a norm, and is completely 
deinstitutionalized when its legitimacy has finished eroding (Oliver 1992). Practices are rarely 
fully institutionalized or deinstitutionalized but are often in between, as the questioning of 
entrenched practices can give room for new practices to emerge (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 
2001). In this sense, deinstitutionalization and institutionalization form the two versants of 
lifecycles in which practices emerge and erode, and form a broader conceptual picture to 
understand institutional change. Deinstitutionalization and institutionalization have however 
often been analysed separately, without empirically accounting for the interrelation between 
the two processes as we attempt to understand the processes and the pathways of institutional 
change (Clemente et al., 2017). Yet, if a practice is falling into abeyance, it might leave space 
for new ones to emerge unless the purpose and objective of the deinstitutionalized practice has 
lost meaning and value for the agents. In sum, in a number of contexts, institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization happen jointly. 
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Deinstitutionalization, as the erosion or discontinuity of an institutionalized activity or 
practice, has a multitude of determinants at both the macro- and the micro-level (Oliver, 1992). 
Research on deinstitutionalization recognizes the key role of agents as they progressively 
disengage from the practice, until only a minority enacts it (Davis et al., 1994). Conceptual 
models of deinstitutionalization flesh out the mechanisms through which individual 
disengagement from a practice triggers a spiral of deinstitutionalization (Clemente & Roulet, 
2015). This argument relies on the proposition that institutionalized practices rely on a majority 
enacting them, while deinstitutionalization is usually the sign of only a minority maintaining 
engagement in the practice. This mechanism relies on social control, as agents are punished for 
engaging in a practice that is marginalized and rewarded for engaging in a practice that has 
become a norm (Glynn & Huge, 2007). This approach also stresses the importance of the 
population of organizational members and its characteristics in the deinstitutionalization of 
practices. 
We argue that a focus on the lifecycle of institutional change, with phases of 
deinstitutionalization and institutionalization, is a specifically informative context to 
understand the importance of multiple levels of analysis in advancing the micro-foundations 
agenda in institutional theory. In this study, we acknowledge for agency at the employee level 
and its consequences for organizational decision making, while exploring the co-occurrence of 
deinstitutionalization and institutionalization. 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND HYPOTHESES IN CONTEXT 
Our empirical setting is the UK legal industry. Law firms are a prominent professional service 
firm industry, characterized by knowledge intensity and a professionalized workforce (Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). The importance of human capital in this industry makes it a perfect case 
to study micro-foundations, considering the key role played by individuals and groups of 
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individuals. The global legal industry tends to follow an American model (Dezalay & Garth, 
2004) dictating organizational practices, in particular with regards to their career system 
(Malhotra et al., 2010; Malhotra et al., 2016). 
 In this study, we focus on the progressive emergence of non-equity or salaried 
partnership as an alternative to equity partnerships. Equity partners own part of the partnership 
and are entitled to part of the earnings, which makes this stage in a career very attractive, and 
plays an important role in motivating senior employees of law firms. Partnership is the natural 
promotion associates aspire to, as their careers progress (Malhotra et al., 2010; Malhotra et al. 
2016). A decision to promote an associate to partner is risky and not taken lightly by the 
organization, and has a range of reputational and economic consequences (Hitt et al., 2001). 
Law firms can however only sustain a limited number of equity partners as equity partnership 
dilutes equity (Malhotra et al., 2010; Malhotra et al., 2016). Thus, the decision to abandon or 
reproduce the practice of equity partnership is crucial for a large majority of law firms, to attract 
and retain talent but also with regards to how profits are shared. 
Because of the difficulties to sustain a high number of equity partners, the 
institutionalized practice of equity partnership is progressively eroding. This lead to the 
progressive emergence of non-equity (or salaried) partnership (Malhotra et al., 2010; Malhotra 
et al., 2016), a practice that is mostly aimed at retaining top talents by offering them an 
alternative career path to equity partnership. Such practice offers a number of strategic and 
instrumental advantages to the firms adopting it by allowing them to increase leverage and often 
profits. Law firms can also frame the practice as fitting with different life choices. In this sense, 
the new practice is accepted and spreading (Colyvas & Jonnsson, 2011) thus signalling not only 
institutionalization, but also diffusion, through its adoption. The rise of the non-equity 
partnership is concurrent with a reduced proportion of equity partners because the two are 
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mutually exclusive. Our Figure 1 shows how the percentage of non-equity partners on the total 
number of partners in the Top 100 law firms in the UK rose from 35% to 50%. 
Insert figure 1 about here 
We now turn towards looking at the different explanations for why specific 
organizations might start deviating from the norm of equity partnership and adopt non-equity 
partnership, seeing how different levels of analysis might be connected in triggering 
institutional change. 
 
Individual and organizational characteristics and institutional change 
As stressed in our theory section, individual- and organizational- levels of analysis are deeply 
interrelated. The population of an organization will necessarily affect its behaviour (Felin et al., 
2015), and, as individual-level behaviours aggregate, a critical mass of similarly minded 
individuals can orient organizational decisions. In our case, the partners are the ones that have 
been consecrated by the institution, and they also happen to have significant decisional power. 
 
Some determinants of institutional change are expected to be distinct from and, at least 
to some extent, unrelated to the population within the organization. One important predictor of 
the career structure and opportunities in law firm is profitability, considering that equity 
partnership is aimed at sharing this profitability with an increasing number of individuals 
(Malhotra et al., 2010). We could expect that equity partners in profitable firms may want to 
avoid sharing the profit and that profitable firms may thus be more likely to abandon a practice 
that dilutes profits. Thus, we could expect that higher profitability per partner will make e firms 
more likely to deviate from the existing practice of equity partnership, in order to avoid sharing 
profits. Profitable firms may also have more room and leeway to be at the forefront of the 
deinstitutionalization process and thus innovate by adopting a new practice and abandoning the 
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old one (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004). Alternatively, one could argue that profitability may 
enable firms to stick to existing practices, and not experience the need to change practices for 
survival, thus conforming to dominant existing practices. When looking at non-profitable firms, 
these too may have incentives to adopt or non-adopt new practices. For example, non-profitable 
firms may adopt non-equity partnership in order to avoid sharing more what is already a low 
pool of profit1. Campbell (2007), however, argues that from an institutional perspective, firms 
with poor profitability are unlikely to engage in new practices, because they lack slack 
resources.  Thus, we see that there are theoretical arguments to link profitability and adoption 
of the new practice both positively and negatively and we thus intend to test those two sets of 
competing mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 1a: Profitability per partner is positively associated with the adoption of 
non-equity partnership. 
Hypothesis 1b: Profitability per partner is negatively associated with the adoption of 
non-equity partnership. 
 
In addition, we can expect compensation disparity to affect disengagement from equity 
partnerships. Wide inequalities in wages are often associated with inequalities in the status of 
employees (Belliveau et al., 1996) and with the fragmentation of the organizational population 
in subgroups of different salaries. In addition, as explained by Amis and colleagues (2018), 
inequalities tend to reinforce themselves through the materialization and ultimately 
institutionalization of practices perpetuating inequalities. There are also significant evidences 
in economics that institutional change endogenously reinforces inequalities: Fortin and 
Lemieux (1997) found that a positive association between the rise in wage inequality and 
                                                      
1 We are grateful for the reviewer’s suggestions to flesh out those mechanisms associating 
profitability and the adoption of the new practice. 
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deunionization or economic deregulation. Finally, non-equity partnership enables the firms to 
give the partner title without the access to the profit pool, as a status benefit, to compensate for 
a non-competitive remuneration at the industry level (Greenberg & Ornstein, 1983). 
Consequently, we can expect compensation disparity to be associated with the rise of non-
equity partnership:  this new practice increases inequality by fragmenting the population of 
partners as a function of their access to profit. In other terms, firms offer the title of partners 
but differentiate two pathways conditioning the incomes of the two groups. 
Hypothesis 2: Compensation disparity is positively associated with the adoption of non-
equity partnership. 
 
In addition, the business model of the law firm could play a crucial role in triggering 
deviance from an institutionalized practice. Law firms as professional service firms are highly 
reliant on their human capital (Von Nordenflycht, 2010) but there is some variance in the extent 
to which human capital is used as a strategic lever (Bowman & Swart, 2001). Strategic human 
resources practices often become institutionalized because of the prevalent value proposition in 
an industry (Wright & McMahan, 1992). Some firms might decide to rely on cheaper, lower 
quality and thus less qualified associates to increase profitability. In this case, elite lawyers 
become expendable and the firm has an incentive in abandoning equity partnership as associates 
are a less crucial asset in such business model. High leverage ratio signals the large number of 
associates by contrast with the number of partners. It means that the business model is not based 
on the high quality of top partners. In this case, the firm will be more likely to disengage from 
equity partnership and engage in non-equity partnership as it would not fear a leakage of human 
capital. At the same time, if the business model is not based on the quality of partners, the 
willingness and incentives to retain and promote talent might be limited. Such situation creates 
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low strategic incentives for changing practices, so we could alternatively expect firms with high 
leverage ratio to stick to equity partnership. 
Hypothesis 3a: A high leverage ratio is positively associated with the adoption of non-
equity partnership. 
Hypothesis 3b: A high leverage ratio is negatively associated with the adoption of non-
equity partnership. 
 
In addition, we could expect diversity within the organization, in particular gender 
diversity, to prompt disengagement with equity partnerships. Existing research has shown that 
a more diverse base in the relationships with outside stakeholders could prompt new practice 
adoption (Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). A more diverse employee base may also be more open to 
institutional change, especially as individual members of an organization, in their diversity, can 
provide the basis for support to a new practice (Vican & Pernell-Gallagher, 2013). Law firms 
may also use non-equity partnership strategically to maintain the status quo with regards to 
diversity. Non-equity partnership can help prevent emerging minorities to reach the equity 
partnership level by giving them access to a second best option to retain them.  
Hypothesis 4a: Gender diversity is positively associated with the adoption of non-equity 
partnership. 
 
Positive evaluations might also play a role in deviation from the norm (Paolella & 
Durand, 2016). One of the key social evaluation playing a role in the engagement with 
institutions is reputation (Rao, 1998). Reputation is defined as the “stakeholders’ perceptions 
about an organization’s ability to create value relative to competitors” (Rindova et al., 2005: 
1033).  The uncertainty about the quality of a service provider is compensated by the exchange 
of information that forms the basis for a reputation judgement (Rao, 1998). Reputation at the 
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organizational level can be conceptualized as the aggregation of micro-level behaviours (Etter 
et al., forthcoming), and in sectors in which human capital is so crucial such as in professional 
service firms (Von Nordenflycht, 2010) individuals can be the main drivers of reputation. In 
fact, in this case, high reputation of individuals can translate into high reputation for the 
organization. 
In the case of law firms, partners are ranked and compared on a regular basis as experts 
in their areas. Partners are compared to their peers across firms, at the field level. They make 
or break the reputation of their organization as the individual interactions with institutionalized 
practices can yield organizational consequences that deter or encourage organizations to enact 
or refuse institutional change (Roulet, 2019). Although they form a collective for the 
organization, star lawyers can drive up the deference of stakeholders towards the organization. 
Higher reputation partners will tend to be conservative with regards to opportunities of 
institutional change. They will reproduce existing practices that have benefitted them and their 
reputation (as it enabled them to become partner) and will also align against new practices. 
Conformity to institutional practices is usually seen at odds with reputation as a signal of 
differentiation, but individual differentiation may compensate for a non-discriminating posture 
at the organizational level (Bergh et al., 2010). Thus we expect that the higher the average 
reputation of the partners in an organization, the more reluctant their organization will be to 
disengage from the practice.  
Hypothesis 5: The average reputation of the partners will be negatively associated with 
the adoption of non-equity partnership. 
 
METHODS  
Data collection 
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We built a comprehensive dataset capturing the characteristics of organizations (UK law firms) 
and their senior employees (partners). We collected data on the reputation of UK lawyers in the 
legal directory Chambers and Partners for the period 2000-2016 (as in Paolella & Durand, 
2016). This guide is an invaluable and indispensable source of guidance for in-house counsel 
in large corporations worldwide. It is designed primarily for firms that require access to pre-
eminent practitioners in specific areas of law for instructing cases. Based on extensive 
independent research, Chambers and Partners provides rankings of the best lawyers operating 
in a specific practice area. We selected eight different practice areas (competition-antitrust, tax, 
litigation, employment, corporate, intellectual property, real estate, bankruptcy) because they 
are independent and unrelated according to the experts and lawyers that we interviewed in 
preparation of this study. These practice areas not only cover conveniently all the scope of law 
firms, but are also at the top of the list of work usually sent externally by clients and in-house 
counsels. In addition, we collected data on the law firms in which the ranked lawyers were 
affiliated with using the professional publication Legal BusinessWeek. 
 
Variable definition 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the number of non-equity partners within a firm. 
The higher this number is, the higher the degree to which the firm has engaged with the new 
practice and disengaged from the institutionalized practice. 
 
Independent variables.  
As our independent variable, we first included profit per equity partner as a measure of firm 
performance. To capture compensation disparity we included the spread between the top of 
equity partners and the bottom of equity partners in terms of compensation. Leverage is 
computed as the ratio associates to partners (Kor & Leblici, 2005). We use the percentage of 
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female partners on total as a measure of gender diversity. Finally, to capture reputation, we 
used an average of the reputation of all partners across different practices. Chambers and 
Partners adopts an ordered scale for each practice area for each year ranging from 1 to 7, with 
1 representing the highest rank. We inverted the scale to obtain an increasing value order from 
1 (the lowest-ranked lawyer) to 7 for lawyers at the top of the guide’s ranking. For example, in 
our dataset a lawyer ranked in ‘tax’ with a value of 5 has a higher reputation than a lawyer with 
a value of 3 in the same practice area. We also included dummy variables to control for specific 
effect of each practice area. We finally captured time fixed-effects by including a set of dummy 
variables in our models. 
 
RESULTS 
To test our hypotheses, we ran random-effects negative binomial models. Descriptive statistics 
for the variables used are presented in Table 1, and correlations are presented in Table 2. Results 
testing hypotheses are reported in Table 3. Model 1 contains firm-level variables only and 
already yields interesting results to understand the deinstitutionalization process. 
Insert table 1 about here 
Insert table 2 about here 
Insert table 3 about here 
Importantly, profit per equity partner is negatively associated with non-equity 
partnership (significant at the p < 0.01 level) thus supporting hypothesis 1b. Profitable firms 
conform to the dominant existing practice, as they do not need to adapt for survival. Non-
profitable firms may adopt non-equity partnership in order to avoid further sharing of the profits 
between partners. 
While we would expect compensation disparity to be associated with the furthering of 
practice reproducing inequality within the firm – such as mixing non-equity partnership and 
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equity partnership - we note that compensation disparity does not affect the propensity of firms 
to disengage from the institutionalized practice. We do not find support for hypothesis 2.  
Contrary to our first expectation, leverage ratio is negatively associated with 
deinstitutionalization (significant at the p < 0.001 level), meaning that when the ratio of 
associates to partner is high, the firm will stick to equity partnership. This result supports 
hypothesis 3b. We might explain this result by the fact that firms with high leverage are 
focusing on commoditized services and thus have little need for non-equity partnership to retain 
top talent. Thus, those firms stick to the institutionalized practice of equity partnership.  
Model 2 adds another variable: the ratio of women among ranked partners in the 
Chambers. This variable has a positive and significant effect (p < 0.05) on the adoption of non-
equity partnership, suggesting support for hypothesis 4. This is aligned with our argument that 
diversity within organizations makes them more likely to adopt new practices because of the 
variety of contexts and backgrounds of their employees. The counter-argument concerning the 
use of non-equity partnership as a tool to discriminate against minority is invalidated. 
Finally, Model 3 supports our theoretical argument regarding reputation (hypothesis 5): 
we find that the average reputation of lawyers within an organization negatively affects the ratio 
of non-equity partners on total number of partners (significant at the p < 0.001 level). This result 
means that organization with members of higher reputation can afford to maintain a costly 
institution. In this case, law firms with partners of higher reputation are reluctant to engage in 
deinstitutionalization. This can be due to the fact that the existing practice of equity partner is 
seen as a positive asset that contributed to the higher reputation of its partners, thus making it 
likely to be maintained. 
 
DISCUSSION 
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In this study, we focused on institutional change as a lifecycle of deinstitutionalization-
institutionalization of equity and non-equity partnership in the UK legal industry. We explore 
the determinants of this process at the individual- and at the organizational-level by looking 
specifically at how the population of organizational members and its characteristics affect the 
strategic decision of the firm to disengage with an institutionalized practice to enact a new one. 
 We identified and discarded a number of factors that could explain institutional change 
towards non-equity partnership, mostly focusing on the pragmatic and economic reasons for 
adopting a new practice. We noted that wage inequality in the firm had no effect on the erosion 
of equity partnership. At the same time, profit per equity partner shows a negative relationship 
with the rise of non-equity partnership, meaning that profitable firms see limited incentives in 
switching to a new practice. Leverage shows an orientation of law firms towards selling 
commoditized services. Because of this orientation towards lower value added services, these 
firms have a limited need to avoid high turnover and retain top talents who are trying to reach 
partner level. As a consequence, firms with high ratio of associates on partners will have limited 
incentives to abandon the practice of equity partnership. More gender balanced firms at the 
partner level are more likely to switch to non-equity partnership, suggesting that gender diverse 
firms are more prone to adopt the new practice. Finally, the aggregated reputation of a firm’s 
lawyers is negatively associated with the deinstitutionalization of equity partnership. This result 
suggests that higher reputation lawyers will push their organization to stick to the practice of 
equity partnership, associating it with their success. 
 
Contribution to institutional theory 
While micro-foundations have often been understood as, broadly speaking, a focus on agents, 
we further develop the idea that micro-foundations do not necessarily only reside at the 
individual-level and that this individual level has consequences on organizational decision 
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making when averaged and aggregated at the organizational level. We started the paper by 
stressing the existence of a continuum of levels affecting institutional processes – from 
individuals to organizations, finally trickling up to the field-level and triggering institutional 
change through the concurrent deinstitutionalization and institutionalization of practices. Our 
paper expands on the role of multiple levels of analysis in the micro-foundations of institutional 
theory (Harmon et al., 2018) by considering the characteristics of populations within 
organizations and how these populations influence organizational decision making. We indeed 
tested how individuals, because of their biases, and as a collective, can influence an 
organization’s decision to deviate from or conform to an institutionalized practice. Agents of 
deinstitutionalization can thus be organizations pushed by their composition and demography. 
For example, in our case, we looked at the sharing of profit, and the leverage of the firm, which 
are organizational-level aspects determined by the demography of the organization. A closer 
look to diversity within organizations may yield interesting results with regards to the behaviour 
of these organizations with regards to institutions. For example, one could look at other forms 
of diversity beyond gender. 
 Suggesting a full continuum of levels of analysis to understand micro-foundations of 
institutional theory opens a number of new questions and areas of research. Accounting for 
multiple levels of analysis recognizes that some levels might be more important than others 
depending on the setting and context. With a sole focus on individual as micro-foundational 
determinants of (de)institutionalization we run the risk of missing a key explanatory 
mechanism. It is indeed crucial to look into the characteristics of populations within 
organizations to understand organizational behaviour and ultimately field-level change. 
 
Limitations and future research 
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We offer a broad empirical exploration of the factors that might explain the 
deinstitutionalization of equity partnership and the institutionalization of non-equity 
partnership. Further research could cover a wider time frame, and the legal industry in multiple 
countries, to capture more adequately the institutional dynamics. We chose an empirical context 
in which institutional change can be captured through a cycle of deinstitutionalization and 
institutionalization succeeding to each other, thus picking a specific ‘pathway’ of institutional 
change (Micelotta et al., 2017). Previous studies of deinstitutionalization have recognized that 
the deinstitutionalization of institutionalized practices might not necessarily make room for new 
practices to emerge (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). In our case, non-equity (or salaried) partnership 
progressively replaced equity partnership (Malhotra et al., 2010; Malhotra et al., 2016) and this 
might have favoured the deinstitutionalization process. We could expect that without a new 
emerging practice to replace the old one, high reputation individuals will resist 
deinstitutionalization even harder as they know that the alternative is yet to be shaped. Future 
research could differentiate situation in which deinstitutionalization is followed by another 
period of institutionalization. In our empirical context, it is however difficult to disentangle 
whether the process of deinstitutionalization and institutionalization is due to a higher appeal 
of the multi-tier partnership (including both equity and non-equity partnership) or a lower 
appeal of the collegial partnership (including only equity partnership), or both.  
 As we stress the importance of studying a continuum of levels of analysis to understand 
the micro-foundations of institutional theory, building upon Harmon et al. (2018), we call for 
future research to further this stream of work. How does individual resistance to an 
institutionalized practice shift towards group resistance? When does this resistance reach a 
critical mass or a threshold beyond which we can consider a practice (de)institutionalized 
(Clemente & Roulet, 2015)?  
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In addition, we could wonder whether our results are generalizable to other professional 
service firms (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). How do other professional service firms such as 
investment banks, audit firms or consulting firms differ in their determinants of engaging in 
institutional change? The perception of typical practices in the investment banking industry for 
example depends on the sub-groups within this field (Roulet, 2015; 2019). In fact, within 
investment banks, we could expect senior executives in equity research to perceive more 
negatively typical practices such as bonuses and lobbying compared to executives in the 
mergers and acquisition teams. The stigmatization of minorities in audit firms also epitomizes 
the negative consequences of institutions and the resistance of employee groups (Stenger & 
Roulet, 2018). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we empirically examined how organizational deviance from equity partnership 
resulted in the erosion of this practice in the UK legal industry and the emergence of non-equity 
partnership as an alternative practice. By studying a specific institutional lifecycle and the co-
occurrence of deinstitutionalization and institutionalization processes, while examining both 
demographic and organizational determinants, we acknowledge the diversity of micro-
foundational mechanisms in institutional theory. While micro-foundations have often been 
understood, broadly speaking, as a focus on agents, we further develop the idea that micro-
foundations do not necessarily only reside at the individual level. In fact, we stress the 
importance of taking into account a continuum of levels affecting institutional processes, in 
particular as population within organizations influence their decision making with regards to 
institutionalized practices, ultimately affecting institutional processes at the broader level. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
FIGURE 1: Percentage of salaried partners on total number of partners 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
non-equity partner 683 66.72 94.94 0 840 
profit per equity partner 683 447.96 241.30 65 1832.5 
spread top/bottom eq. 
partners 683 410495.60 308309.30 9000 3550000 
leverage 683 2.66 0.97 0.73 7.38 
lawyers gender 683 0.21 0.22 0 1 
lawyers reputation 683 2.79 0.91 1 6 
partnership size 683 159.01 178.16 18 1302 
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TABLE 2. Pairwise Correlations 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. non-equity partner      
2. profit per equity partner 0.28      
3. spread top/bottom eq. partners 0.08 0.11     
4. leverage 0.03 0.40 0.03    
5. lawyers gender 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.06   
6. lawyers reputation 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.32 -0.02  
7. partnership size 0.86 0.49 0.08 0.28 -0.01 0.27 
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TABLE 3. Random-Effects Negative Binomial Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES         
profit per equity partner -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
spread top/bottom eq. 
partners 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.644) (0.778) (0.647) 
leverage -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lawyer gender  0.15 0.15 
  (0.045) (0.046) 
Lawyer reputation   -0.08 
   (0.000) 
partnership size 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 3.38 3.43 3.78 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Likelihood -2793.69 -2785.2 -2778.35 
Wald chi-square 1085.94 1073.78 1071.93 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 683 683 683 
p-value in parentheses  
 
 
